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CONSENT IN RAPE CASES IN SWAZILAND.' 
A BOHAN'S RIGHT TO DECIDE
ALICE ARMSTRONG*
i l  Z
sH = r X -rv.rx;rL::^ ^^
in the law of Swaziland,1 *with reference to, recent judgements.
1 . THE CONSENT OF THE VICTTH
When a woman is battered, bruised, found naked and half dead by he
Iht °f. I16 5°ad’ and then claims .she has been raped, the public and 
the criminal justice system are quick to rise up in anger and 
ndignation and to take her allegations seriously. There is no doubt 
that, such a brutal crime is abhorred by all right-thinking persons. 
However, most rapes which occur, and even most rapes which reach the 
courts do not have such a violent character.3 In most rape
trials, the central issue involves determining whether the female 
complainant has consented to the intercourse.
2* VIOLENCE, THREATS OF VIOLENCE. AND SOBHISSION
Roman-Dutch common law defines rape as unlawful and intentional sexual 
intercourse with a woman without her consent. Physical violence or 
force is not a necessary element of the crime. Lack of consent is 
sufficient.  ^ The law therefore makes a distinction between
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe.
Swazi Customary law is applied in the customary (Swazi
National) courts. General law, Including Roman Dutch common 
law and statutes, is applied in the Magistrate's Courts and 
High Court. Both court systems have-jurisdiction over criminal 
cases, although the Swazi National Courts are not empowered to 
deal with cases in which death is an element. Therefore, 
theoretically, rape cases can be dealt with under the customary 
law. However, the policy of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Police is to prosecute rape cases only in 
the High Court.
Probably only a small percentage of the rapes which are 
actually committed.
See, Armstrong, "Women as Victims: A Study of Rape in
Swaziland", in Armstrong (ed.)(1987) Women and Law in Southern 
Africa Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House.
Hunt, (1982) South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II 
Cape Town, Juta, p. 442. —  '
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submission which is Induced by fear and threat of violence, and 
consent which is freely given.-
The clearest definition of the distinction between consent and 
submission for Roman Dutch law is found in R.v.Swlggelaar 5 :
If a man so intimidates a woman as to induce her to abandon 
resistance and submit to intercourse to which she is unwilling, 
he commits the crime of rape. All the circumstances must be 
taken into account to determine whether it is merely the
abandonment of outward resistance which the woman, while 
persisting in her objection to the intercourse, is afraid to 
display or realises is useless^
Because of stereotypes of how women behave sexually, and 
particularly when faced with sexual assault, the distinction between 
submission and consent is often blurred. Women are expected to be 
passive partners to be seduced rather than active partners in sexual 
encounters. Because a woman is expected to be passive, the court 
often infers from her passivity her consent to the Intercourse. In 
the same way, women who are forced to have sexual intercourse are 
expected to fight back, ’screaming, crying and fighting for their 
virtue." 4 56 789
The notion that a woman who "really does not consent" will fight 
back has been clearly rejected by modern behavioral scientists 
studying rape. Understanding of "appropriate" behaviour for the rape 
victim has Increased dramatically in recent years. Studies emphasise 
the life-threatening nature of the sexual assault, concluding that:
"The typical rape victim's behaviour is terror-induced, 
pseudo-calm, and detached during the rape episode....Thus, the 
major coping task of the rape victim is not to avoid sexual 
contact, but to survive." ?
In fact, a major study in the United States found that only about one 
fourth of rape victims physically struggle with their attacker. ®
In Swaziland, fear of physically harm is likely to play an even 
larger part in the behaviour of most rape complainants since most rape 
cases which reach the courts involve young girls, below the age of 16^ 
Although, as a general rule, most women are vulnerable to the greater 
physical strength of men, this vulnerability is even more pronounced 
in the case of young girls.
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4. Hunt, (1982) South African- Criminal Law and Procedure Vol. II, 
Juta, Cape Town, p. 442
5. R v. Swlggelaar 1950 (1) PH H61 (AD)
6. Connors, "Violence against Women", a paper presented to the 
Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers, Zimbabwe, 26 July-1 
August 1986.
7. Griffiths, "Understanding the Behavior of the Rape Victim: Fear
is the Key", in The Detective. Vol. 12, Ho. 1, Spring 1985, p. 
5, at p . 6.
8. Ibid.
9. Armstrong, op. cit., at p. 260.
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It is clear that a woman's submission due .to fear might b« 
misinterpreted by judges unfamiliar with the psycho-dynamics of strer.s 
In violent situations. This Is particularly true of male judges who 
might find It difficult, to understand the extent to which females are 
affected by fear. As a result, judges have historically had a 
tendency to Interpret a woman's failure to struggle and fight her 
sexual attacker as a sign of her consent to the act.
It Is encouraging that this trend appears to be .changing In 
Swaziland. Judicial attitudes have improved dramatically In recent 
years, exhibiting a sensitivity to the plight of the victim of-serial 
attack. This may be because of extensive - publicity on the ..crime of 
rape, efforts on the part of women's groups to highlight the problem 
of rape in Swazi society, the Government's sympathy for this Issue 
evidenced by some -Important legislative changes with regard to 
procedure,in rape trials , or simply a change in the composition 
of the bench. Two cases will serve as examples.
The court in R. v Etelulno Albert Joaquin H ,  decided in 1979., 
failed to appreciate the distinction between consent and submission. 
In that case the court declared:
It seems to me that if the complainant was truly resisting the 
accused would not have been able to force sexual intercourse. 
His hand was engaged in throttling her and he would have found 
it well-nigh impossible to force and keep her legs apart while 
taking off. her pantie and penetrating her. He. apparently had 
full intercourse with her while she was crying.
Such a statement exhibits a profound misunderstanding .of and 
lack of empathy- for the girl, who was faced with a life-threatening 
situation, frightened, and trying to preserve her life. On the other 
hand, by 1984, judicial attitudes seem to have changed and the court 
in Regina v Nhlanhla Coolbay Nhlabetsl ^  correctly recognized the 
distinction between consent and submission. In that case:
Accused took the Complainant to a hut, kicked open the door, 
told the complainant to enter, lighted a lamp and bolted the 
door. He , told her to lie on a bed and removed his trousers 
and had intercourse. She carried out these instructions as he 
had a knife and she, was afraid he would carry out his' threat 
to kill her... Counsel for the Defence pointed, out that the 
Complainant walked with Accused to the hut where intercourse 
tookplace, she climbed on to the bed herself, did not resist 
when her panties were removed, and allowed her legs to be 
opened. She bore no bruises' or other signs of injury.
These facts were held to amount to no more than submission, and not to 
constitute consent. 102
10. Including the introduction of trials in camera in 1985;
11. R. v, Etelulno ’ Albert Joaquin Criminal Case 33/1979
(unreported).
12. R. v. Nhlanhla Coolbay Nhlabatsi, Criminal Case S224/1984 
(unreported).
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3. SEXUAL BLACKMAIL AMD UNDUE INFLUENCE
A woman may be pressured into having sexual Intercourse with a man 
because of that man's position of power over her. This Is
particularly true In a society such as Swaziland, where all women are 
expected to submit to the constant supervision and obey the
Instructions of men. A Swazi woman, at least In times past and under, 
customary law, Is a perpetual minor^, always under the guardianship 
of her husband or father. This obedience and submission on the part 
of .women creates a situation where all men hold a position of power 
over all women. A woman, particularly a young woman, may therefore be 
pressured into having sex with a man simply because she has been 
taught to obey men.
In addition, In both the public and private sectors, men hold 
the vast majority of positions of authority. Unscrupulous men may .
use their authority to Induce women to submit to sexual Intercourse. 
For Instance, a woman's boss may threaten to sack her If she does not 
sleep with him, or an employer say that he will only hire her If she 
agrees to sleep with him. The scope for sexual blackmail Is Infinite.
Finally, women are consistently In a worse financial position 
than men, both because of lower wages In paid employment, and 
discrimination towards women in their power to own and manage 
property, 15 Their lower economic status makes them an easy prey for 
men who offer to pay for their sexual services, or to give or take 
sway employment as a result of sexual favours given or withheld. A 
woman who Is confronted by a man demanding sexual Intercourse Is 
Indeed under substantial pressure to submit to his desires.
The common law does not recognize that threats and 
Intimidation, other than threats of violence, may Induce submission to 
sexual Intercourse. Neither does It recognize the psychological and. 
financial vulnerability of women to what amounts to "sexual blackmail" 
16 In which a woman submits to sexual Intercourse with a man because 
of his position of power over her. In Swaziland, the case of R. v. 
Prince Maquba 1^ Illustrates this. The accused was a Prince, a' son 
of the King a a member of Parliament. He approached the complainant 
and demanded sexual Intercourse with her. In the course of the 
conversation, he asked the young complainant why she was not showing 
respect to an older person who wanted to talk to her. The judge 
failed to discuss the question of submission, although the girl must 
have been Intimidated by this older man In authority over her. 134567
13. Marwick, (1940) The Swazi London, p. 66.
14. Very few women are employed at managerial administrative posts 
- see Armstrong and Russell, A Situation Analysis of Women In 
Swaziland (1985) Kwalusenl, University of Swaziland Social 
Science Research Unit, p. 8, Table 3.
15. See generally Armstrong and Nhlapo, (1985) Law and the Other
Sex; the legal position of women in Swaziland Mbabane, 
Webster's and Nhlapo, "Law versus Culture: Ownership of
freehold land in Swaziland" in Armstrong (ed.) (1987) Women and 
Law In Southern Africa Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House.
16. This term Is borrowed from the language of the Zimbabwe 
Criminal Law Codification Committee In Its Commentary, p. 13.
17. R. v. Prince Maguba, 1979-81 Swaziland Law Reports 349.
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In recent years, women in many jurisdictions have called for tha 
imposition of criminal liability in such situations, and some La e 
been successful. Canadian law provides that there is no consent where 
"submission results from the application of force or threats of force 
to the victim or someone else, fraud or the exercise of authority" 18
Reformers in South Australia argue that "consent which is 
grudging or elicited by substantial pressure of the victim should be 
regarded as inoperative." They are asking for a legal provision
providing that submission Induced because of the accused's position of 
authority over the victim, or his position of trust over her, or '^ien 
she is detained under his care or the victim is under the age oi 18 
and living in the accused's family home, is not legal consent. 1°
Several countries have created separate sexual offences to de<1 
with this problem. In India, sexual intercourse between certain
specified persons, such as a public servant and women in his custody 
or the staff of a hospital and women in the hospital, is a crime. ® 
New Zealand has introduced the crime of "inducing sexual connection" 
which makes it a crime to induce sexual Intercourse by:
(I) an express or implied threat that the offender of some or some 
other person will commit an offence punishable by imprisonment, 
which does not Involve the actual or threatened application of 
force to any other person,
(II) an express or implied threat that the offender or some other
will make an accusation or disclosure, whether true of false,
about the misconduct of any person, living or dead, and the
disclosure.is likely to damage that person's reputation, and
(ill) an express or implied threat by the offender to make improper 
use of any power or authority arising out of any occupational or 
vocational post held by the offender to the detriment of the 
victim, or any commercial relationship existing between the 
offender and the victim 21
The Criminal Law Codification Committee of Zimbabwe has 
suggested the following section of the proposed Criminal Code:
36.(1) Any male who unlawfully and intentionally has vaginal or 
anal sexual Intercourse with a female or performs any other 
Indecent act upon her after having used threats or intimidation, 
not being threats of violence, in order to Induce the female to 
allow such acts to be performed upon her shall be guilty of an 
offence. 18920*
18. Connors, op. clt., at p. 37.
19. Ibid, referring to the Naffin Report.
20. Indian Penal Code, s. 376 A-376-B.
. New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, s. 129a cited in Connors, op. cit. 
p. 38
21
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(2) It shall be no defence to this offence that the female 
consented to the act of sexual Intercourse Itself after the 
threats or' Intimidation had been used. 22 234*
It is clear that submission to sexual intercourse may occur in 
situations where the woman has not truly consented, but which the law 
has historically failed to recognise as rape. Women in a position of 
vulnerability should be protected from sexual exploitation by a 
recognition that submission resulting from such undue pressure does 
not amount to consent.
4. FRAUD
The issue of fraud with regard to consent in rape cases is a difficult 
one. The common law position is that fraud which represents an error 
personae or an error in negotlo will be vitiate consent, but any other 
kind of fraud will not. The case of R. v Prince Maquba ^3 discusses 
the issue of fraud. In that case, the complainant was approached by 
the accused, who was the half-brother of the man to whom she had borne 
a child and was to marry. "The accused told her he would like to take 
her over - 'gena' her - while his brother was still alive." The 
complainant alleged that the accused then raped her, but the court did 
not believe her story, saying,
it is probable that although there was no rape in the sense 
testified to by the complainant, the accused and the 
complainant did have intercourse, her consent thereto having 
been induced by the misrepresentation that he was an older 
prince who was entitled to demand intercourse with her. It is 
what one might describe as a siSwati type of droit de seigneur. 24 -------
The Judge goes on to discuss the application of the law if the 
facts are as he has postulated:
even if the facts be as I have postulated them, this does not 
constitute rape in law. It is of the essence of rape that 
intercourse should have taken place without the consent of the 
woman concerned; and fraud may vitiate consent. But it has been 
held that it is not every fraud that will have this effect: it 
must be a fraud inducing either an error personae - for example 
X inducing Y to believe that he is her husband - or an error in 
negotlo for example X inducing Y to believe that the act of 
intercourse is indeed intercourse and she is deceived only in 
regard to the effects it will have or the attributes of the 
person having the intercourse with her, her consent is not 
vitiated... It appears to me that any misrepresentation by the 
accused in regard to his right to nqena the complainant would 
fall into this category, and would not vitiate the consent. 2^
22. The proposed Criminal Code is not in force, or even translated 
into a Bill. This information is taken from a cyclostyled 
version of the proposed code circulated for comment, but not 
published.
23. Op. cit.
24. at p. 333
25 Ibid
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Therefore when the Prince fraudulently convinced the young girl 
that he had a right to sexual intercourse with her, and the girl 
submitted to his wishes' under the impression that she was bound to do 
so, she was held to have consented to sexual intercourse and there was 
no rape. The case was treated in the same way as a situation where a 
man fraudulently promises to marry a woman and gains her consent in 
that way, or fraudulently misrepresents his financial status and gains 
her consent because she thinks he is rich.
5. 'STATUTORY RAPE'
In Swaziland, as in most common law Jurisdictions influenced by 
English criminal law, there is a provision for so-called "statutory 
rape." The Girl's and Women's Protection Act 39/1929 makes it an 
offence for a male person to have unlawful carnal connection with a 
girl under the age of sixteen years. The consent of the girl is 
irrelevant under the statute.
There are two questions with regard to statutory rapp. The 
first question is, what is meant by "unlawful intercourse"? The 
second is, since a Woman's consent is not necessary for a valid 
marriage under customary law, what is the position where the girl 
under the age of 16 has been married without her consent?
What is "unlawful intercourse"? The general common law rule, 
based on English law, is that all intercourse within marriage is 
lawful, so that a husband cannot be convicted of the rape of his 
wife. Therefore, intercourse with a girl below.the age of 16 who is 
validly married would be lawful intercourse, and not forbidden by the 
statute. Since a marriage under Swazi customary law has no age limit, 
a girl below the age of 16 can legally marry, intercourse within such 
a marriage would be lawful, and the husband could not be convicted 
under Act 39/1929.
This issue was considered in R. v. Mhlabane.27 The accused had 
been convicted in the Magistrate's Court of unlawful carnal.connection 
with a girl of fourteen years in contravention of the Girl's and 
Women's Protection Act. The main issue on appeal was whether the 
complainant and the accused were ' married at the time when sexual 
intercourse took place according to Swazi law and custom, and if so 
whether the accused should have been found guilty under the Act. The 
magistrate suggested that even if the complainant and accused were 
married according to Swazi Law and Custom, since the girl was under 
the age of 16, the Girl's and Woman's Protection Act and the 
"repugnancy clause" 28 required the accused to wait until she reached 
16 before having sexual relations with her. The appeal court 
disagreed saying:
it does not appear to me that the marriage of a girl of 
fourteen years old followed by sexual intercourse would in 
Swaziland necessarily be regarded as being repugnant to natural 
Justice or morality ... no general rule can be laid down 2678
26. Hunt, op. clt., at p. 347-9
27. R.v. Mhlabane 1977-78 Swaziland Law Reports 188.
28. S. 11 (a) of the Swazi Courts Act 80 of 1950 which says that
Swazi customary law should be administered "so far as it is not 
repugnant to natural Justice or morality" (cited at p. 190 of 
the Mhlabane Judgement).
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but....each case must be judged on the female but her mental and 
physical capacities which should be the main relevant 
consideration In the application of the repugnancy test. If 
these are adequate then the customary practice whereby the 
consent of the child Is not necessary to the marriage would not 
be regarded as repugnant. The position might be different If 
the child does not consent to the actual Intercourse, but here 
she in fact did so.29
The court held that the traditional ceremony Indicating 
marriage, the smearing of red ochre, had not yet taken place when the 
accused had sexual relations with the complainant, . and therefore a 
valid customary law marriage did not exist at the time of the 
intercourse.
The second question is the question of consent to marriage. The 
girl in the Mhlabane case had apparently not consented to the marriage, 
but had consented to the intercourse. The court held that a marriage 
vlthout consent is legal under Swazi Law and Custom, but reasoned in a 
circular manner. The judge seems to be saying that if the child is 
mentally and physically capable of giving her consent, then her consent 
is not necessary for the marriage. Surely it is illogical to say that 
if she can consent, then her consent is not necessary. The court then 
states that the important issue is whether the child consents to the 
actual intercourse, yet under Act 39/1929 the consent of the girl is 
irrelevant and a man can be convicted even if the girl consents to the 
. intercourse.
This issue touches at the very root of the rule that all 
Intercourse within a valid marriage is legal, even if the wife does not 
consent. The rule is based on the premise that once a wife consents to 
intercourse with her husband by marrying him, she consents to all acts 
of intercourse with him in the future and for all time. A marriage to 
which the wife never consented would not seem to afford the husband the 
same protection. ■ The learned judge in the Mhlabane case Beems to 
recognise this by his statement that "The position might be different 
If the child does not consent to the actual intercourse, but here she 
in fact did so."
One other, earlier case also discussed the issue of consent for 
minors this time with regard to the traditional ceremony of endlsa, 
which is a kind of engagement ceremony. In Regina v. Shlmela alias 
Madandla Kumalo 29 30 the accused was convicted of rape, even though he 
had gone through the endlsa ceremony, on the grounds that although in 
customary law sexual intercourse is allowed after endlsa, it is allowed 
only with the consent of the girl. Therefore, although intercourse was 
lawful, it was lawful only with the girl's consent. This case seems to 
make an important distinction between saying that intercourse is 
lawful, because sanctioned by a public ceremony such as marriage or 
endlsa, and saying that intercourse is permitted at all times, even if 
the woman does not consent. The law would be more just if marriage was 
treated as the endlsa ceremony was treated in this case, and sexual 
intercourse was permitted only with the woman's consent.
29. at page 190
30. 1956 High Commission Law Reports 105.
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These issues are not moot points in Swaziland today? Some 
women, and not just young girls, are still married without their 
consent. A woman in her twenties may be kidnapped by her boyfriend's 
family, and smeared with red ;ochre, against het will. According to 
customary law the marriage is perfectly legal. Although Marwick 
reports that the consent of the Woman's family is necessary and that 
"Nowadays the Administration requires that the girl should agree to tht 
marriage..." 31 f Such coerced Carriages continue to this day, and are 
treated as legal by all Concerned parties. A further complicating 
factor is that all strictly traditional marriages pretend to have' an 
element of this coercion ' as the bride in the traditional ceremony 
pretends- that she does not want td leave her family and cries her 
anguish in the early morning hours.
Two solutions to this problem are possible. The first is to 
declare that marriages without the consent of the bride are not lawful 
marriages, and the second is to reject the notion, never explicitly 
accepted in Swaziland or any other Roman-Dutch jurisdiction, that 
marriage makes forced intercourse between the spouses legal. Both are 
necessary to fully protect freedom of choice in sexual matters for 
young girls.
6. COmAXCTS CONSISTENT 3ITH LACK OF CONSENT
In.a rape case, evidence that, the victim complained of the rape 
immediately after the event Is admissable to show consistency with her 
claim that she did not consent to the intercourse. This is an 
exception to the hearsay rule of evidence which ordinarily does not 
allow evidence of statements made to another person. This complaint 
must be made at the earliest possible opportunity to the first person 
to whom she might reasonably make it. The rule is based on the 
assumption that the natural and appropriate response of a woman who has 
been raped is to tell the first person she sees.
/The rule is clearly applied in rape cases in Swaziland. The 
leading case is Mkhwanazl v. R 32 which explains that a complaint:
is not to be taken as proof of the acts complained of and can 
only be legitimately used to show that the complainant's conduct 
was consistent with the complainant's testimony, to negative the 
complainant having consented to the sexual intercourse (where of 
course such- consent is relevant) and to show that the 
complainant's conduct was What would be expected in a truthful 
person in the circumstances described by her. 33
The court in that case found 1 that the complaint was not made 
spontaneously, but only as a response to beatings by the mother. It is 
clear that in such a case, where the complaint may not have been freely 
given, it is better that'it cannot be admitted into evidence.
31. Marwick p. 124
32. 1979-81 SLR 83
33. at p. 86. The case refers to the Botswana case of Butale v. The
State, Criminal Appeal 73/1978, for a tabulation of the
requirements for admissibility of complaints.
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However, some cases seem to have gone further than this, 
working on the assumption that all victims of rape, If they have truly 
been raped, will immediately report the fact to the first available 
person. Rather than operating to admit evidence that would otherwise 
be inadmissable, several judgements suggest that failure to complain 
of the rape immediately has become a factor which casts doubt upon the 
truth of the complainant's allegations. For instance, in Regina v 
Bernard Bhaza Dlamini 34 the court said:
"[Complainant] was staying with her grandmother. If was dark 
when she got home and her grandmother had gone to bed. [She] 
did not awaken her to make a complaint and went to sleep in the 
cooking hut. One would have expected her to rouse her 
grandmother and complain if she had been raped as she says.”
In R. v. Timothy Mkhwanazi 35 the magistrate said that he could not 
be certain that the complainant had not been a consenting party since 
she had not complained to her mother. And in R. v. Prince Maquba 36 
the judge questioned the fact that the complainant did not report to 
the first person she saw saying:
Dzandzane was the first person to whom she reported. She had, 
as appears in cross-examination, an earlier opportunity of 
reporting as she met one LaShongwe along the way. But she did 
not report to LaShongwe as she was not of her family. This may 
be an adequate explanation, but I have some doubt in regard to 
it. She also said she did not think it necessary to tell 
Lashongwe. I think the natural thing to have done would have 
been to report to her.
Modern behavioural scientists have done important research on 
what is actually the "natural thing" to do in such a circumstance. 
The pattern of the victim's response to sexual assault has come to be 
known as "rape trauma syndrome". Specialists describe this pattern as 
constituting two phases. The first phase begins about the time the 
victim is released by or escapes from her attacker. It is 
characterized by disorganization, in which the victim's life is 
disrupted by the impact of the rape incident. Depending on the 
severity of the attack, the victim may experience feelings of shock or 
disbelief, alternating with fear and anxiety. She will then usually 
develop one of two styles of coping with her emotions: an expressed 
style, in which she displays her feelings by crying, sobbing, smiling, 
and becoming restless or tense; and a controlled style in which she 
masks her feelings behind a calm, composed, or subdues appearance. 37 
The second stage begins two to three weeks after the attack, when she
34. Criminal Case 174/1983. In spite of the judge's statement, the 
accused was convicted. The case was later appealed on the 
grounds of insufficient corroboration, but the judgement was 
upheld (Appeal Case 48/1983).
35. R.v. Timothy Mkhwanazi 1970-76 Swaziland Law Reports 268.
36. Op. cit., at p. 350.
37. Griffiths (1985) "Rape Trauma Syndrome: The Overlooked
Evidence in Rape Investigations" The Detective Vol 12 No. 1 
Spring, p. 1.
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tries to reorganize her life and integrate the episode into her life, 
and cope on a long-term basis. ^8
It is the first stage which interests us. here, and should change 
our assumptions that it is always appropriate for a rape victim to 
complain to the first person available. The response of many rape 
victims, approximately half in studies done abroad is to withdraw
rather than to blurt out their feelings and fear. The victim's fear 
may result in reluctance to repeat the details of the incident to 
anyone. She may even experience difficulty recollecting the details 
of the incident in the hours immediately following the incident. 
Experts have documented what they call "psychological infantilism", a 
response to fear that has a numbing effect on the victim and is not 
easily dissipated. Finally, the victim may refrain from reporting
because of a perverse sense of gratitude, similar to the "Stockholm 
Syndrome" found in hostages:
Since the rapist has complied with the victim's ultiuate 
wish— he allowed her to live— she may not report the incident at 
all, or only report it after time has diminished the impact of 
the incident and her gratitude for being released. ^
These studies point to the fact that the Immediate complaint 
. doctrine, at least when wrongly used to mean that lack of immediate 
complaint is equal to a false complaint, fails to understand the 
shock, numbness, . confusion and fear the rape victim may be feeling 
immediately after the episode.
7. THE MBMT&L STATE OF THE ACCUSED
A further complicating factor with regard to consent in rape cases is 
that the prosecution must prove not only that the woman did not 
consent, but also that her male attacker was aware that she was not 
consenting. In other words, the mens rea. for the crime of rape 
requires that the accused either knew that the woman did not consent 
or foresaw the possibility that she was not consenting and acted 
recklessly with regard to that possibility. Whether a reasonable 
person would have believed and acted as the accused did is
irrelevant. This principle was clearly enunciated in the English case 
of DPP v . Morgan. Although the Morgan case has not yet been
followed in any case in Swaziland, it has been explicitly accepted in
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 6
40. Ibid., p. 7
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43 DPP v Morgan, 1976 AC 182, [1975] 2 All ER 347 at p. 352
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one southern African case, the Zimbabwean case of S. v. Gardner.
It seems clear that the case would also be followed in Swaziland.
The question of the reasonableness of an accused's belief that 
a woman is consenting to-intercourse is clearly a difficult problem in 
any. society. On the one hand,, it is unjust for a man who genuinely 
thought that the woman consented to Intercourse to be convicted of 
rape, but on the other hand it is necessary to avoid a situation where 
any accused person can testify that he thought the woman was 
consenting because he though "all women fought and screamed during 
sexual intercourse. ^5
In most societies of the world women are assumed- and socialized 
to be passive sexual partners and men to be aggressive in sexual 
matters. It is no different in Swaziland. A woman is taught to 
reject the advances of a man, even to be as unkind to him as possible, 
as part of the courtship ritual. This attitude is compounded in
modern times by . the pervasive influence of religion, which also 
teaches young girls to avoid sexual contact. As a result, the woman 
may be confused within herself as to whether to say no or yes, and the 
man may be even more confused over what the woman is really saying. 
It is not surprising that men sometimes force themselves on an 
unconsenting woman and then are genuinely surprised to learn that she 
did not consent. . On the other hand, it does not mean,that every man 
can assume every woman will consent to his advances if pressured.
The situation is further complicated by findings of behaviour 
scientists on the victim's response to rape during the incident. The 
behaviour of the rape victim has been described in this way:
The behavior of the vast majority of women during their, 
contact with rapists demonstrates this traumatic psychological 
inflantilism. In the atmosphere of primal terror, not only do 
people submit, but also psychological inflantilism, with its 
consequent helplessness, makes it appear to the outsider that 
their behaviour was friendly and cooperative. It is a response 
of frozen fright that confuses everyone: the rapist, the
victim's family, her friends, the police, and even the victim 
herself. ^
Therefore, the submissive behaviour discussed above may - not 
only confuse the court in determining whether the victim has
consented, but also may confuse the accused during the attack itself.
Several jurisdictions have attempted to deal with these 
difficult problems. There are two possible responses. The first is 
to shift the burden of proof. Although it is a defence for the 
accused to argue that he believed that the victim was consenting, it 
is the accused who must convince the trier of fact of his belief.
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44. Zimbabwe Supreme Court Case 3/1983
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This relieves the prosecution of the difficult task of proving the 
mental state of the accused. ^8 The provision may be formulated tp 
require the accused to prove on a balance of probabilities his defence 
that he believed the victim to be consenting.
The'second requires the introduction of an objective element 
into the question of the accused's belief. . In some jurisdictions1, 
such as some Australian states and New Zealand, the accused's belief 
that the. victim was consenting must be a reasonable one. ^  A 
variation on this theme 1b to provide for a separate offence of sexual 
intercourse under the mistaken belief that there was consent. This 
was suggested by the Criminal Law Codification . Committee of Zimbabwe 
which has proposed the following Section:
34. Any male who has vaginal Sexual Intercourse with a 
mentally competent female Over the age of sixteen or who 
performs any other indecent act upon her under the mistaken 
belief which was in the circumstances Unreasonable that the 
female had consented to the sexual intercourse or to the 
performance of the indecent acts upon her shall be guilty of an 
offence.
This goes much further than the English law, which provides 
that the reasonableness of the accused's belief is only taken into 
account in determining whether the Accused is telling the truth. ^0
8. CONCLDSION
I have attempted to examine the question of consent in rape cases with 
reference to cases in Swaziland, recent research of behavioural 
scientists, and recent - developments in the law in other 
jurisdictions. The central isBue Involved in the crime or rape is the 
question of freedom of choice in BexUal matters. No person should be 
forced to submit to sexual intercourse-against her wishes. There is 
no room for the attitude, noted by Justice Ben Dunn, "It appears thajt 
far too many males have it deeply embedded that they have a right tb 
sex with any woman any time." ^1
48. Connors, op. cit«, p. 40.
49. Connors p.. 38.
50. Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (England and Wales), s. 1
(2).
51. Times of Swaziland 4/4/84.
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